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ABSTRACT 
The competence of moral sensitivity is increasingly regarded as key for the morality of 
people’s social and professional behavior. However, specialized training strategies have 
yet to be developed. Training moral sensitivity through video games seems to be a 
particularly promising approach. This paper presents a research design for a strategic 
evaluation of numerous game mechanisms concerning their ability to support the 
development of moral sensitivity. In the first step, the competence of moral sensitivity is 
broken down into more concrete sub-competences and learning outcomes, which shall be 
achieved. In the second step, a complementary framework for the strategic selection and 
implementation of suitable game mechanisms shall be designed. The present paper 
exemplarily introduces 15 training strategies, which effectively support the development 
of attitudes and values. Such validated strategies can aid the selection and design of 
relevant game mechanisms. Based on this framework, game mechanisms can be 
evaluated against their specific relevance for particular learning outcomes, and their 
general ability to realize relevant training strategies. Two game mechanisms are 
exemplarily evaluated in terms of their ability to foster the attitude of universalism, and 
their general ability to be used for the achievement of attitudinal learning outcomes. The 
overall framework shall enable a systematic evaluation of game mechanisms for the 
promotion of cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral learning outcomes linked to moral 
sensitivity. The framework will be transferable to the game-based training of other 
competences, though.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to introduce the design of an evaluative framework, which 
can support the strategic selection and implementation of suitable game mechanisms for 
the training of moral sensitivity. We regard moral sensitivity as the competence to 
recognize the ethical dimensions of a particular problem, and afford them appropriate 
importance for behavior and decision-making (Section 2). Our effort is part of a three-
year project funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation, which aims at designing 
and testing a custom-made Serious Moral Game for the training of moral sensitivity.  
Supporting the development of moral sensitivity through video games seems promising 
for various reasons: First, we expect that a well-designed video game would be a 
particularly motivating and engaging learning experience, thereby promising deeper and 
more effective learning (Ezeryel et al. 2014). The meta-analytical findings of Vogel et al. 
(2006) show that, under circumstances of self-control, game-based learning is viewed as 
more motivating than traditional teaching methods. In a more recent meta-analysis, 
Wouters et al. (2013) come to similar results: However, they highlight that the motivation 
to play serious games may be deteriorated significantly, if the games are imposed on 
players by instructors, and when players lack real autonomy in playing. Secondly, we 
assume that such video games may actually be more suitable than many other learning 
pathways for the acquisition of ethical competences like moral sensitivity, because they 
allow the experience of one’s actions’ outcomes in a simulated context, where mistakes 
and conscious wrongdoing don’t have negative repercussions for individuals or their 
environment. Finally, the latest insights into learning indicate that learning is most 
effective when it is active, experiential, situated, problem-based and provides immediate 
feedback (Boyle et al. 2011) – features that can be realized more effectively in video 
games compared to other learning media. The meta-analysis of DeSmet et al. (2015) 
supports this notion, indicating that serious games are effective for learning, particularly 
when they draw upon game-based learning theories.  
1.1. Challenge 
The featured meta-studies on game-based learning reflect to which extent particular 
features of games mediate the overall learning achievements – however, they are not 
necessarily capable of assessing, which game mechanisms are actually fit for which 
purpose, i.e. the achievement of the relevant learning outcomes (LOs). Concerning the 
functioning of particular game mechanisms, there are many evaluations of existing video 
games available. However, video games usually combine several game mechanisms and 
embed them in a complex gaming environment, which may bear such components as a 
narrative (storyline), visual and acoustic features etc. (Christen et al. 2013). Therefore, it 
is difficult to find research on the functioning of single, isolated game mechanisms. In 
addition, the existing studies don’t usually compare different game mechanisms for the 
achievement of particular LOs – instead, most comparative studies contrast game-based 
learning with non-game-based learning (e.g. Yang 2012).  
Secondly, the existing studies rarely consider the achievement of the exact – or even 
related – learning outcomes, which we are interested in (those that promote moral 
sensitivity). Evaluating the potential of video games for the purpose of moral education is 
a rather recent phenomenon, although several suggestions exist on how to classify games 
with respect to their use in ethics education (e.g., the Ethics Practice and Implementation 
Categorization (EPIC) Framework; Schrier 2015). To our knowledge, the development of 
moral sensitivity hasn’t been a subject of empirical game research so far. In fact, there are 
only very few empirical studies that investigate the training of moral sensitivity in general 
(Antes et al. 2009, Baykara et al. 2015, Waples et al. 2009).  
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1.2. Research Approach 
Considering this challenge, we believe that a framework for the systematic evaluation of 
game mechanisms will be helpful. Our goal is to develop an evaluative framework, which 
we can use in identifying suitable game mechanisms for the training of moral sensitivity, 
and in deciding about their concrete design, combination and implementation. Due to the 
nature of both games and training as complex, interactive processes, which are impacted 
by many factors, we would only expect to draw knowledge in terms of strategic 
recommendations from working with such a framework; these recommendations should 
be empirically and theoretically informed, but cannot represent knowledge in terms of 
validated cause-effect relationships.1  
From our perspective, the evaluative framework needs to be two-faceted: 
1. It should utilize concrete, measurable learning outcomes (LOs) as reference 
points for the identification of suitable game mechanisms. There should be good, 
theory-based arguments that particular game mechanisms can possibly contribute 
to the achievement of (at least) one of the LOs, which we consider important for 
the development of moral sensitivity. 
2. It should offer the means for an assessment, whether the relevant game 
mechanisms are promising from both an educative and a motivational 
perspective. The educative test concerns the potential of a particular game 
mechanism to realize generic training strategies, which have proven to be 
effective. The motivational assessment concerns the suitability of a particular 
game mechanism for engaging the relevant target group in immersive play. I.e. 
the motivational test concerns the ability of a game mechanisms to correspond 
with possible motives of players. 
While the first aspect of the evaluative framework would test, whether a particular game 
mechanism is relevant for our purposes at all, the second line of evaluation would aim at 
deriving recommendations for the concrete construction of game mechanisms and their 
possible combination. We need to consider the option that single game mechanisms could 
be suitable for the achievement of several relevant LOs. Similarly, we must assume that a 
combination of several game mechanisms could be stronger (and more enjoyable) than 
relying on only one game mechanism. 
With this in mind, we foresee four major steps in terms of developing our evaluative 
framework and using it for purposes of game design. The first foundation of our 
framework must be a firm understanding of the desired LOs that shall be achieved 
through the learning and teaching activities. Hence, the first step of our investigation will 
focus on the operationalization of moral sensitivity in terms of LOs (Section 2). In this 
conceptual paper, we will lay out the scope of possible types of learning outcomes, and 
present a concept for the formulation of measurable LOs, along with an example. 
The second foundation of our evaluative framework consists in validated theories 
concerning the achievement of relevant LOs, or at least learning outcomes of the same 
type, as well as validated motivational theory. This step of our investigation concerns the 
identification of relevant evaluation criteria. Section 3 will exemplarily present a 
checklist, which summarizes evidence on the development of values and attitudes, a 
                                                     
1 We are interested in validating the effectiveness of particular game mechanisms for the training 
of moral sensitivity. Relevant considerations are beyond the scope of this paper, though.  
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particularly important type of learning outcomes underlying moral sensitivity. Future 
studies will also consider other types of learning outcomes, i.e. competences, skills and 
knowledge, the examination of which is beyond the scope of this research design. 
Once the evaluative framework is in place, it can be used for the assessment of game 
mechanisms that may potentially serve the training of moral sensitivity, and to derive 
recommendations on their implementation. In Section 4 of this research design, we 
present a selection of exemplary mechanisms, which have already been realized in video 
games, and demonstrate how we would utilize the evaluative framework. In Section 5, we 
will discuss more generally, how the outcomes of this study can be used for the 
construction of a Serious Moral Game, i.e. a video game that should allow to measure 
and improve moral competences (Christen et al. 2013). 
2. OPERATIONALIZATION OF MORAL SENSITIVITY  
We regard Moral Sensitivity (MS) as the competence to recognize the various ethical 
dimensions of a particular problem, and afford them am appropriate importance for 
behavior and decision-making (Tanner & Christen 2013, Jordan 2009). As a central 
dimension of moral decision-making proposed by James Rest (1986), MS has received 
growing attention in the past years. Moral blindness, the absence of MS, is increasingly 
recognized as a driving force of unethical behaviors in diverse contexts, e.g. business and 
medicine (Clarkeburn 2002, Bazerman & Tenbrunsel 2011). Numerous studies have 
helped to conceptualize and validate the concept empirically and theoretically (e.g. 
Bazerman & Tenbrunsel 2011, Blum 1991, Jordan 2009, Moberg & Seabright 2000, 
Pedersen 2009, Reynolds 2008, Reynolds & Miller 2015, Weaver et al. 2008). 
In this section we discuss how MS can be operationalized in terms of learning outcomes 
(LOs) for purposes of learning, training and assessment. Following the definition of 
Adam (2004), which has been adopted by the European Commission, e.g. for the Bologna 
Process and the European Qualifications Framework for Lifelong Learning (EQF 2008), 
we understand LOs as written statements of what the successful learner is expected to be 
able to do at the end of a learning process (ECTS 2015). Measurable LO descriptions 
aren’t only necessary for the evaluation of learning (Bergsmann et al. 2015), but also 
offer invaluable guidance in the selection of appropriate methods of teaching, learning 
and assessment. Before we describe the approach, by which we will define measurable 
LOs for our evaluative framework, we will present the scope of relevant types of learning 
outcomes, which we envision for the training of MS. We will do so, by presenting some 
exemplary hypotheses about what may be relevant learning objectives for the 
development of MS. A typology of learning outcomes is particularly important for our 
efforts, because the generic learning strategies, which shall be part of our framework (see 
Section 3), will usually relate to the development of particular types of learning 
outcomes, e.g. knowledge, or skills (Kraiger et al. 1993).   
Tanner & Christen (2013) integrate MS as a competence in their theory of Moral 
Intelligence, next to the competences of Moral Commitment, Moral Problem-Solving, and 
Moral Resoluteness. Competences form the most sophisticated types of LOs, since they 
relate to the ability to fulfil complex, non-standardizable challenges, which require the 
activation of diverse psychosocial resources (including skills, attitudes and knowledge) 
through a reflective process in a particular context (OECD 2003, Katsarov et al. 2016, p. 
51). As our definition of MS shows, it is appropriate to be considered a competence, 
since MS cannot solely rely on automated skills or immediate attitudes, but will generally 
require a somewhat critical reflection of the concrete situation, even when a person can 
heavily draw on refined mental schemata. 
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For the sake of elaborating how MS may be best achieved, we need to operationalize it in 
terms of more concrete LOs. Thus, we will split up the competence of moral sensitivity 
into less complex, and more readily measurable sub-competences, as well as LOs in 
terms of psychosocial resources (skills, attitudes and knowledge), which we view as 
particularly relevant for the realization of MS.  
2.1. Sub-Competences 
In our understanding, MS can be broken down into three sub-competences. Together, 
they compose the competence of Moral Sensitivity. They need to be actualized jointly, in 
order for a person to act in a morally sensitive way: 
 
 Noticing: A person’s ability to take notice of warning signals and situational 
cues, which point to the possibility of moral misconduct in a particular situation. 
For example, does a manager notice the concern of an employee via her verbal 
and non-verbal communication?  
 Anticipating: A person’s ability to anticipate the potential risks of particular 
situations and behavioral options for different stakeholders. For example, can a 
manager imagine, how confidential customer information could be abused?  
 Associating: A person’s ability to assess the relevance of moral values for the 
evaluation of a particular situation or behavioral option. For example, to what 
extent does a manager consider the values of equal opportunity and fairness when 
selecting an employee for promotion?  
2.2. Psychosocial Resources 
Furthermore, we assume that other types of psychosocial resources are important. As 
several researchers argue (e.g. Moberg & Seabright 2000), empathy is an important 
resource for MS.2 We share this perspective to some extent: Empathy is probably an 
important socio-cognitive pathway for Noticing. It makes sense that a person who 
(cognitively and affectively) understands, how another person is (or might be) affected by 
a particular development, will more easily notice diverse moral implications of the 
situation. Therefore, empathy can be considered a skill, which will promote MS. We view 
fully developed skills as scripts (Abelson 1981), through which we can unfold relatively 
complex processes automatically, e.g. 10-finger typing or the recognition of facially 
expressed emotions (Kraiger et al. 1993). When particular skills/scripts aren’t fully 
developed, actions necessitate more of a conscious effort, which is more time-consuming 
and strenuous (Kahnemann 2012). 
The assumption that semi-automatic processes like empathy support MS (in addition to 
conscious thinking) corresponds with a growing body of empirical evidence (e.g. Haidt 
2001, Lapsley & Hill 2008, Reynolds 2008). However, as many critics point out, 
empathy is often distorted: People tend to be empathic for the people close to themselves, 
and tend to only consider the perspectives (and moral standards) of the groups, to which 
they want to belong (Opotow 1995, Hürter el al. 2016). Moral blindness often occurs due 
to absorption with one’s in-group’s needs, interests and perspectives (Bazerman & 
Tensbrunsel 2011). Therefore, empathy needs to be moderated and focused by a general 
concern for a larger number of different stakeholders. Hence, we consider the ethical 
                                                     
2 There is already some evidence that empathy is an important resource for moral decision-making 
and actual moral behavior (e.g. Pohling et al. 2015). 
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value of universalism, which describes the appreciation and the concern for the welfare of 
all people and nature (Schwartz 1994), as another important resource for MS. Ethical 
values, a particular type of attitudes, play a central role for moral sensitivity. Ethical 
values such as, e.g. autonomy, responsibility, care, or fairness, represent the main 
reference framework for MS, or more concretely, the sub-competence of Associating. 
Ultimately, if a person had, for example, a limited understanding of fairness (cognitively), 
and lacked concern for fairness (motivationally), the recognition of this ethical dimension 
in a particular situation would become impossible. Even when a person was capable of 
Noticing and Anticipating, MS would fail without one being capable of Associating. In 
the Moral Intelligence framework, Tanner and Christen (2013) consequently foresee a 
Moral Compass, which is viewed as an important requirement for moral sensitivity, as 
well as other moral competences. 
Attitudes, and particularly (ethical) values, are often avoided as goals for learning, e.g. 
because they are viewed as being subjective, i.e. lacking the objectivity, which is 
associated with competences or knowledge. This notion is probably rooted in the 
scientific paradigm of logical positivism (Ayer 1936), which posits that propositions that 
cannot be tested by empirical observation and experiment, cannot be true, and therefore 
cannot represent knowledge (Lovat et al. 2011). However, even the facts and theories of 
empirical sciences are value-laden and necessarily subjective to some extent, as they have 
been constructed by human minds in search of meaning (Ferré 1982). Even the skills and 
knowledge, which positivists uphold to be real knowledge, e.g. mathematics, or an 
understanding of evolution, can only be seen as valuable for society, and as sensible 
contents of education, in view of human motivations (e.g. to build bridges or save others 
from harm). Attitudes and values have proven to be relatively stable tendencies of people 
to evaluate a particular phenomenon positively or negatively, leading to particular 
responses in terms of emotions, perceptions and actions (Martens 1998). However, even 
if most ethical values seem to be grounded biologically (Haidt 2012), values as complex 
psychosocial constructs are socialized through groups and organizations, and internalized 
by individuals. Hence, they can be considered part of social reality, in terms of the 
(moral) expectations, which people hold against themselves and others (Schimank 2007). 
From our perspective, the norms, ethical standards and values of a particular community 
can be viewed as legitimate goals for learning – under the condition that they have been 
agreed upon through legitimate institutions and procedures in a domination-free discourse 
(Habermas 2004). Since ethical values, as a particular type of attitudes, need to be 
internalized and support the evaluation of particular phenomena both cognitively and 
emotionally, for them to be of behavioral relevance, they ought to be conceived as a 
distinct type of learning outcome (see Section 3).  
Finally, MS must be considered to be context-sensitive to some extent. Particularly the 
sub-competence Anticipating relates to the awareness (and understanding) of plausible 
cause-effect relationships. A teacher, who understands which impact the use of 
punishment may have on children’s learning, can’t necessarily assess the potential risks 
and side-effects of speculation with derivatives in the domain of finance. Even when 
people understand and appreciate ethical values such as autonomy and fairness, they may 
not be able to assess their relevance in situations, which they don’t fully comprehend. 
Thus, domain-specific knowledge must also be considered important for MS. Knowledge 
represents the type of learning outcome, with which we are probably most familiar. It 
relates to people’s retention of facts, and understanding of cause-effect relationships 
(among others) (Kraiger et al. 1993). 
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2.3. Defining Measurable Learning Outcomes 
As we have stressed above, learning outcomes are most valuable for purposes of 
evaluation, and the selection of approaches for teaching, learning and assessment, when 
they are measurable. Learning outcomes can be formulated at diverse levels of precision. 
The central criterion for deciding about the desired level of precision should be the 
informational needs of the particular target group(s), e.g. learners, teachers, game 
designers, quality managers of educational institutions etc. (Utility Standard of the 
JCSEE, 2011). For the general purpose of selecting relevant game mechanisms for the 
development of moral sensitivity (MS), we will only require relatively general LOs.3  
Following Gosling & Moon (2002, p. 19), a well-written LO should contain  
 “A verb that indicates what the learner is expected to be able to do at the end of 
the period of learning. 
 Word(s) that indicate on what or with what the learner is acting. If the outcome is 
about skills, then the word(s) may describe the way the skill is performed […]. 
 Word(s) that indicate the nature (in context or in terms of standard) of the 
performance required as evidence that the learning was achieved.” 
To illustrate what kinds of LOs we want to use in evaluating the relevance of game 
mechanisms for the training of MS, we will work with one exemplary LO in this paper: 
the ethical value of universalism (see above). We suggest that the attitudinal LO, which 
conveys the value of universalism, could be to “feel concern for the general public, 
including diverse groups of stakeholders, when considering the morality of one’s 
actions”. Such a (pluralistic) concern for the general public would necessitate overcoming 
attitudes, whereby one doesn’t consider the needs and interests of people, who don’t 
belong to one’s own in-group (e.g. race, religious community, enterprise) in decision-
making. This corresponds with the fact that people usually already hold more or less 
strong attitudes, e.g. for/against tax evasion, migrants, or plastic surgery. Therefore, 
attitudinal LOs mostly correspond with the strengthening or replacement of pre-existing 
attitudes (Martens 1998).  
3. UTILIZATION OF GENERIC TRAINING STRATEGIES 
The second foundation of our evaluative framework will be generic training strategies, 
which have proven to be effective in the development of the relevant LOs, or at least for 
similar types of LOs. There is a rich body of knowledge concerning the achievement of 
different types of LOs, pertaining to the most effective educational interventions. This 
sort of knowledge can support the systematic evaluation of game mechanisms, which 
belong to the relevant type of LO. In the following, we provide an exemplary overview of 
some existing evidence relevant for the development of attitudes (and values), a particular 
important type of learning outcomes underlying MS (see Section 2). Future studies will 
also consider other types of LOs, i.e. competences, skills and knowledge, the examination 
of which is beyond the scope of this presentation of our research design. Furthermore, 
general evidence on the motivational mechanisms of video games will be considered (e.g. 
Weiser et al. 2015).  
                                                     
3 For purposes of concrete game design, we propose more granular LOs, which are highly specific, 
e.g. in terms of the concrete cause-effect-relationships or problems, which learners should be able 
to comprehend and deal with, once they have completed the game.  
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Evidence on the Achievement of Attitudinal Learning Outcomes 
Following Martens’ synthesis of empirical studies on the achievement of attitudinal LOs, 
the following 15 training strategies are particularly powerful, especially when they are 
combined, and implemented repeatedly over a longer period of time (1998, p. 169). We 
have organized them in three sections:  
A. Beliefs, which people have about a particular subject, often serve to maintain a 
particular attitude. Prejudice, for instance, is often based on flawed beliefs. Therefore, 
the sharing of information is an important instrument for attitudinal change. The 
following mechanisms are particularly important: 
1-3 The source of the information, which shall transform attitudes, is ideally 
viewed as (1) similar to oneself, (2) sympathetic, and (3) prestigious. This 
enables a positive identification with the bearer of the information. 
4 The bearer of the information is best represented live or through multimedia, 
which catch more attention (e.g. film). 
5-6 The information is best presented in such a way that the learners (5) can 
contrast several positions, and (6) shape their own opinion. Telling people, 
which attitudes to have, is counterproductive. 
7 The information should be presented in such a way that the learners find it 
personally relevant, e.g. by giving them the opportunity to personally respond 
to it, or by portraying a person who is similar to the learners, and how this 
person experiences the particular problem. 
B. The adoption of new attitudes (replacing prior attitudes) and the intensification of 
existing attitudes strongly benefit, when learners are convinced of the usefulness and 
personal meaningfulness of the attitudes: 
8 Existing self-concepts and attitudes of learners ought to be embraced as far as 
possible, as long as they don’t contradict the attitudinal LO. 
9-10 Learners should learn to understand, (9) how they will benefit from a new 
attitude, and (10) how some of their prior attitudes may inhibit them from 
reaching their goals.  
11 The meaningfulness of attitudinal change is best reinforced by engaging the 
learners emotionally, i.e. exciting them. However, when negative feelings, e.g. 
fear, are too intensive, they become counterproductive.  
C. Appraisal through oneself and others is a driving force of attitudinal change and 
maintenance: 
12 Learners more eagerly adopt attitudes, when they are convinced that the 
majority of the (informed) members of their group have adopted (or would 
adopt) these attitudes. 
13 Discussions support the formation of relevant attitudes, but only when a 
majority of group members favor the attitudinal LOs, and when there are no 
group members who hold extreme oppositional positions. 
14 Behaviors, which endorse the attitudinal LO, should be rewarded. 
15 When learners publically endorse a particular attitude (e.g. in a group), they 
tend to hold onto it more strongly in the future.  
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4. EVALUATION OF RELEVANT GAME MECHANISMS  
For the construction and identification of video games, which can promote the 
development of MS, we want to evaluate diverse game mechanisms, which have already 
been realized in computer-based games, simulations and software applications (Apps) for 
self-driven learning. Our goal is to evaluate a large number of game mechanisms, 
including those already proposed for the development of morality, particularly by 
Christen et al. (2013) and Schrier (2015; Schrier & Gibson 2010). The main criteria for 
the evaluation of relevant game mechanisms will be:   
1. Logical, theory-based arguments for their possible contribution to the 
achievement of one of the LOs, which we consider important for the 
development of moral sensitivity (Section 2), and  
2. Their ability to realize as many of the relevant training strategies for the 
particular type of LO as possible (as illustrated in Section 3 for attitudinal 
learning outcomes), as well as suitable motivational mechanisms.  
In this presentation of our research design, we will restrict ourselves to evaluating two 
game mechanisms, so to illustrate the principles of our evaluation, and the corresponding 
procedure of analysis. We will omit an evaluation of the motivational power of these 
game mechanisms for the time being, as well.  
Exposure to Others’ Perspectives 
Video games can expose players to the perspectives of others in two general ways: 
a) By playing someone in another role than one's own, for instance a person of 
another gender, or of another profession, e.g. playing an investigative journalist 
dealing with one’s own area of work. Playing an Avatar is already known to 
enable psychological effects of some duration (Ganesh et al. 2011, Rosenberg et 
al. 2013). 
b) By making it a necessary mean for the player’s advancement in a game to 
understand the perspectives of different groups of stakeholders, e.g. through 
dialogues with non-player characters (NPCs), who represent these groups. 
1. Relevance for the Development of Universalism 
Both of these game mechanisms seem particularly relevant for the achievement of the 
attitudinal LO of universalism, which we have defined as a person’s ability to “feel 
concern for the general public, including diverse groups of stakeholders, when 
considering the morality of one’s actions” (Section 2). Batson et al. (1997) have found 
that asking people to take the perspectives of three stigmatized groups (convicted 
murderers, homeless, and people with AIDS), significantly improved their attitudes 
towards these groups. Moberg & Seabright (2000) also posit that exposure to the 
perspectives of people from groups other than one’s own will support the development of 
empathy, a skill which we find important for the sub-competence of Noticing (see Section 
2). Therefore, the two game mechanisms fulfil our first criterion: It seems plausible that 
exposure could support the development of universalism (and empathy).  
2. Ability to Realize Effective Strategies of Attitudinal Learning 
Universalism is clearly an ethical value, and therefore falls into the LO-category of 
attitudes. To see, whether the two game mechanisms are suitable to evoke attitudinal 
learning, we will assess whether they can realize the 15 training strategies, which we have 
identified in Section 3.  
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Table 1: Exemplary evaluation of two game mechanisms. When the game mechanism 
obviously endorses a training strategy (see Section 2), this is marked through a “+”. Where the 
endorsement depends on how a game mechanism is realized, this is marked through “(+)”. In 
cases, where a game mechanism obviously conflicts with a training strategy, this is marked 
through a “-“. Where a negative impact can be avoided, this is marked through a “(-)”.  
In Table 1, both game mechanisms (a = Avatar Exposure, b = NPC-Exposure) are rated 
against each of the 15 training strategies, which are known to support attitudinal learning. 
For example, both Avatar Exposure and NPC-Exposure are rated negatively in 
consideration of training mechanism no. 1, which relates to the similarity of an 
informational source to the learner (player). Since the game mechanisms expose players 
to dissimilar people, a positive realization of this training strategy is implausible – at least 
on first sight. However, when exposure is used to show players that – albeit existing 
differences – they also share similarities with people from other groups, the possible 
negative effect (not believing information) can be reconciled. In the best case, the 
combination of similarities and dissimilarities will actually help players to overcome 
beliefs, through which they exclude others from their own group (e.g. “foreigners”) and 
come to see others as members of a joint group (e.g. as “humans” or “fellow citizens”).  
Numerous examples for the realization of these two game mechanisms in an actual video 
game are offered by Life Is Strange (Dontnod 2015). Here, one plays 18-year old Maxine 
“Max” Caulfield, a first-year student of photography. Throughout the game, Max exhibits 
her own personality, strengths and limitations, offering some degree of exposure to 
others, especially for male players, and people with extroverted personalities. Female, 
white players with more of an introverted personality will more readily identify 
themselves with Max, of course. Most importantly though, Life Is Strange confronts 
players with very diverse characters, including a rich, aggressive boy, a punk-girl, who 
has dropped out of school, and a drug dealer. The game play involves getting to 
understand the perspectives of these – and many other – characters, including the 
circumstances, which have influenced their development in the past, their hopes and 
weaknesses. This creates sympathy for many of the figures (strategy no. 2), and probably 
helps many players to reassess their initial attitudes towards the groups, which the various 
characters represent. Life is Strange is also exemplary in contrasting positive and negative 
attributes of NPC-characters, and possible perspectives on them (strategy no. 5).  
As Table 1 shows, both of the two game mechanisms under discussion seem highly 
promising in terms of achieving attitudinal learning outcomes, for example the ethical 
value of universalism. The detail however, that many of the endorsements are tentative, 
stresses that their potential strongly depends on the way in which they are realized. This 
points to the second function of our evaluative framework: In addition to an initial 
evaluation of the general suitability of a particular game mechanism, it shall guide the 
strategic construction and combination of game mechanisms for them to realize their full 
training potential.  
Training 
Strategy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Avatar-
Exposure 
(-) (+) (+) + (-) (+) (+) (+) (+)  (+)   (+) (+) 
NPC-
Exposure 
(-) (+) (+) + (+) (+) (+) -  (+) (+)  (+) +  
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5. OUTLOOK 
The final aim of these investigations is to create a video game that can supplement ethics 
education. Our approach is to design a game that includes mechanisms that show 
measurable effects with respect to the LOs we have in mind. This means that such a 
Serious Moral Games should integrate two different components: 
- Some sort of a test that measures the “baseline” and the “improvement” of the 
player with respect to – in our case – moral sensitivity, such that a valuable 
feedback can be given to the player, and the games effectiveness can be 
evaluated. 
- A gameplay that integrates the mechanisms in a way that the genuine (playful) 
motivation of the game is sustained, whereas the training effects of the single 
mechanisms is sustained. 
Our research design focuses on the second component, whereas the first component is 
object of previous and ongoing research (Christen et al. 2014, Ineichen et al., under 
revision). For the first component, we will rely on an existing explicit test for measuring 
MS. Briefly, using a vignette-based approach, the measurement instrument has been 
designed to confront people with morally ambiguous situational descriptions and to 
subsequently investigate (1) which values they are more or less likely to identify and (2) 
which values they consider important within the presented scenario. For creating the 
instrument, several steps were necessary to ensure that the vignettes included the relevant 
values, that they were not too easy to be recognized, that the vignettes fulfilled several 
quality criteria (clarity, moral ambiguity, realistic problems etc.) and that the problem 
space is sufficiently covered in order to deal with individual variability not directly 
related to the competence of MS (e.g., familiarity with the presented problems).  
An important task is now to transfer these existing tools into a game environment in such 
a way that the validity of the instrument is preserved, while the testing character is 
sufficiently hidden in order not to interfere with the gameplay. Our current reasoning is to 
transfer the test into some kind of tutorial of the game, such that the problems introduce 
the player into the general appearance of the game (graphics, sound, content, user 
interface), providing in this way some kind of “baseline measurement”. We hope to be 
able to present a prototype at the “Morality Play” workshop. 
Through the integration of such baseline measurements into serious games, it should be 
possible to (1) adapt the game to the player’s predispositions to some extent, so to create 
a more meaningful learning experience, and to (2) measure the effectiveness of the games 
in terms of players’ learning achievements.   
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